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Signiﬁcant diﬀerences in unemployment incidence in Europe have been
observed across skill groups, with the least skilled suﬀering the highest and
most persistent unemployment rates. To identify policies alleviating this
problem, we study the impact of reductions in employer social security
contributions. We construct a general equilibrium model with three types
of heterogeneous workers and ﬁrms, matching frictions, wage bargaining
and a rigid minimum wage. We ﬁnd evidence in favour of narrow tax cuts
targeted at the minimum wage but we argue that it is most important
to account for the eﬀects of such reductions on both job creation and job
destruction. The failure to do so may explain the gap between macro-
and microeconometric evaluations of such policies in France and Belgium.
Policy impact on welfare and ineﬃciencies induced by job competition,
ladder eﬀects and on-the-job search are discussed.
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11 Introduction
The rise of unemployment in Europe since 1970s has been well documented. Un-
employment rates in the European OECD countries have persistently exceeded
the OECD average and, in spite of some reversion at the end of 1990s, remained
high till the present day. It has been especially the case in the four largest
European countries: France, Spain, Germany and Italy, as well as Belgium, as
pointed out by Nickell [2003]. Blanchard [2006] provides a comprehensive survey
of facts and theory pertaining to the European unemployment dilemma.
A number of researchers have also pointed out to diﬀerences in unemploy-
ment incidence in Europe across population groups sorted by education. Nickell
and Bell [1994] document a rise in the unemployment rates of the low skilled
across the OECD. Although, with the exception of a few countries such as the
US, Japan, Norway and Sweden, they ﬁnd that the rise in the low skilled unem-
ployment explains only a fraction of the rise in overall unemployment, they still
show that since 1970s the low skilled rate rose by some 160%, as opposed to some
100% for the high skilled. Gottschalk and Smeeding [1997] are equally sceptical
of unemployment being concentrated among the low skilled. However, given
that the low skilled constitute a rather small (and decreasing) fraction of popu-
lation across the OECD, that comes hardly as a surprise. Nevertheless, Machin
and Van Reenen [1998] do provide descriptive statistics of rising employment
shares of the skilled versus unskilled in, among others, France, Germany, Japan,
the UK and the US. That is somehow in contrast to Krueger and Pischke [1997]
who argue that employment rate changes for less and more educated were in
reality similar. Regardless of such debates about the signiﬁcance of the contri-
bution of the low skilled unemployment to the overall unemployment, Figure 1
shows clearly the evolution of low skilled unemployment rate relative to total
unemployment in the USA and a number of European countries. A striking
observation arises: while the ratio has moderated and stabilised in the USA in
the 1980s, it exploded and have remained very high in Europe.
Various studies have attempted to explain this phenomenon along with the
increase in wage inequality in Anglo-Saxon countries as opposed to Europe,
as shown in Figure 2. To start with, Krugman [1994] proposed skill biased
technological change and rigidities generated by labour market institutions in
Europe as a guilty one. Interestingly, Gregg and Manning [1996] showed, based
on OECD data, that there indeed exists a negative, albeit not very signiﬁcant
(8%), relationship between inequality and unemployment of problematic groups.
Since then a plethora of research have produced evidence that technologi-
cal progress may have increased the relative demand for skilled workers (Au-
thor, Katz and Krueger [1998] or Machin and Van Reenen [1998], for instance).
Trade has been another explanation, starting from Wood [1994] or Borjas and
Ramey [1995]. Yet Berman, Bound and Machin [1998] argue that trade itself,
without skill biased technological change, is unable to explain the shift of em-
ployment towards skill intensive sectors, so does Acemoglu [2003]. In contrast,
contributions of Beaudry and Green [2002, 2003] explain changes in US wages,
and wages and employment in the US and Germany, using models of technolog-







































































Figure 1: Low skilled unemployment rates in proportion to total unemployment
rates: Europe and the USA. Source: Pierrard 2004.




































Figure 2: Wage inequality (D5/D1) as the ratio of high to low wages: Europe
and the USA. Source: OECD Employment Outlook 1996.
3ical adoption and competing modes of organisation.
On the institutions front, Layard and Nickell [1998] provide a study of rigidi-
ties in Europe and conclude on particulary negative eﬀects of unions and unem-
ployment compensation schemes. Blanchard and Wolfers [1999], on the other
hand, point out to the interaction of shocks and institutions as being behind the
evolution and heterogeneity across countries of European unemployment expe-
rience, while Mortensen and Pissarides [1999] explicitly relate unemployment
responses to skill biased technological shocks to labour market policy. If rise of
inequality can be viewed as a ﬂip side of the stable relative unemployment in
the US as opposed to Europe, studies by DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux [1996]
and Card and DiNardo [2002] stress the role of institutions, or rather the dis-
entanglement of institutions, being as important in the rise of wage inequality
as supply-demand considerations or skill biased technological change.
Speciﬁcally on supply-demand, Katz and Murphy [1992] in a simple supply-
demand model explain that the combination of both skill biased technological
change and a slowdown in growth of the relative supply of skilled workers explain
the evolution of wages in the US. Similar conclusions are drawn by Gregg and
Manning [1996] for the UK and Leuven, Oosterbeek and Van Ophen [2004] for
the US and a number of European countries, meaning that continental Europe
did not experience a relative skill shortage seen in Anglo-Saxon countries.
In fact, the supply of skilled labour in continental Europe has seen a marked
increase and some believe that this contributed to the phenomenon of job com-
petition whereby skilled workers evict the less skilled from their jobs. Dolado,
Felgueroso and Jimeno [2000] examine Spanish labour market and ﬁnd symp-
toms of over-education and low intensity of on-the-job search. Dolado, Jansen
and Jimeno [2003] also analyse Eurostat data and ﬁnd evidence of over-education
and crowding-out. Interestingly, Van Ours and Ridder [1995], based on the es-
timation of a matching model, show that in the Netherlands job competition
indeed takes place but only at high levels of education and training. However,
Gautier, Van den Berg, Van Ours and Ridder [2002], using a data set on workers,
jobs and ﬁrm characteristics in Holland, ﬁnd no evidence of crowding-out. Com-
petition is only present at the outﬂow rather than inﬂow of jobs: in downturn,
the low skilled are ﬁred ﬁrst. Clearly, further in-depth empirical research into
the actual extent of this phenomenon in various European countries is desired.
Finally, Pierrard and Sneessens [2004] show for Belgium that the phenomenon
of low skilled unemployment is jointly due to relative wage rigidities at the time
of biased technological change, an increase in the supply of skilled labour and
job competition.
In reality, persistent unemployment in Europe have co-existed with very high
labour taxation, compared to the USA and as shown in Figure 3. Employer so-
cial security contributions were almost three times higher in France and Belgium
than in the USA in 2002. Total tax wedges have in fact been growing steadily
since 1970s (Nickell [2004]). For example, as in Figure 4 drawn for Belgium,
employer social security contributions drifted markedly upwards in mid-1980s.
These could have encouraged ﬁrms to substitute labour for alternative produc-
tion factors, leading to an even larger increase in low skilled unemployment in
4the time of technological change, especially if the light of capital-skill comple-
mentarity argument (Acemoglu [1998]). Interestingly, this taxation rise also
coincides rather well with the rise of low skilled unemployment.
Consequently, targeted reductions in employer taxation have been seen as
a good means of stimulating demand for the low skilled without resurgence in
wage inequality. In fact, since late-1990s France and Belgium have implemented
limited reductions in social security charges at minimum wages. Until 2003, the
estimated value of such subsidies in Belgium amounted to some 3 billion euro,
which is around 1% of GDP (Pierrard [2004]). Because of this rather substantial
cost and policy ﬁnancing dilemmas faced by all governments, there has been
interest among economists in France and Belgium to estimate the impact of
such a policy on employment, economy’s output and productivity, individuals’
welfare and government budget.
Literature on the eﬀects of taxation is abundant. Pissarides [1998] provides
an overview of theoretical ﬁndings. Speciﬁcally, when wages are determined
by bargaining, revenue neutral reforms that strengthen tax progression (e.g.
through tax cuts at low wages) tend to be good for employment since they
discourage wage rises, however the formation of unemployment beneﬁts is cru-
cial. If beneﬁts are ﬁxed (or do not adjust perfectly) with respect to after tax
wages, or if beneﬁts and wages are not taxed at the same rate, employment
eﬀects can be large since the tax changes will unlikely be absorbed by a wage
rise. Sorensen [1999], however, importantly argues that although tax progres-
sion might indeed reduce unemployment, it might as well reduce work eﬀort
and labour productivity. Hence there might exist an optimal degree of tax pro-
gression that equalises the marginal welfare gain against welfare loss from tax
rescheduling. In the same spirit, Kleven and Sorensen [2004] claim that shifting
tax burden away from low wages leads to the reallocation of labour towards
less productive jobs, harms economy’s productivity and in the end its eﬀect on
aggregate employment might be ambiguous. Prescott [2003], in a representa-
tive household and lottery model, analyses the impact of tax wedges on labour
supply in the USA and Europe and ﬁnds it very large1. Nickell [2004] presents
a comprehensive summary of research on tax wedges and provides some con-
vincing intuition. Bargaining models being justiﬁed in the case of Europe, he
ﬁnds that a 10% increase in tax wedge reduces labour input by some 1-3% of
the population of working age2.
Moreover, tax cuts targeted at a labour market segment where minimum
wages are paid should be especially successful in stimulating employment. On
one hand, the elasticity of demand for low skilled labour with respect to wage
cost is empirically high (Hammermesh [1993]). On the other, the existence of
1Some authors claim Prescott’s model to be unrealistic and impossible to calibrate with
reasonable labour market institutions: very high labour supply elasticities imply that with
unemployment beneﬁts, for example, unemployment in Europe would be explosive (Sargent
and Ljungqvist [2005]).
2Nevertheless, that tax diﬀerentials explain only a fraction of labour input diﬀerentials
across countries. Diﬀerences in other elements of labour market institutions (e.g. unemploy-
ment insurance, sickness and disability beneﬁts and alike) are of paramount importance.






































Figure 3: Labour taxation: Europe and the USA. Source: OECD Taxing Wages
2002-2003.








































Figure 4: Labour taxation: Belgium 1970-2000. Source: HERMES.
6a minimum wage makes the wage setting curve ﬂat in the concerned labour
market segment. Given such elasticities, the impact of tax cuts on employment
could be signiﬁcant: employment increase due to a shift of demand is large,
while the oﬀsetting wage pressure due to labour market tensions is low with
rigid wages.
Speciﬁc policy evaluations conﬁrm that targeted policy measures are indeed
more successful in reducing low skilled unemployment than non-targeted ones.
There are, however, big discrepancies in the policy eﬀects predicted by macroe-
conomic and microeconometric studies. Using general equilibirium models with
heterogenous agents and exogenous job destruction, Cahuc [2003] and Chéron
et al. [2002, 2004] for France, and the National Bank of Belgium (Burggraeve
and Du Caju [2003]), the Federal Planning Bureau (Stockman [2002], Hendricks
et al. [2003], Report October 2004) and Service d’Analyse Economique (Pier-
rard and Sneessens [2003]) for Belgium, suggest a modest impact of such polices
on employment and a rather signiﬁcant cost ex post per job created. Microe-
conometric studies, on the other hand, ﬁnd very large employment eﬀects to
an extent that the cost of the subsidy is more than compensated by the reduc-
tion in spending on unemployment beneﬁts and the increase in revenues from
labour taxation3. This diﬀerence has occasionally been attributed to possibly
large substitution eﬀects between subsidised and non-subsidised jobs, if a job
created in a ﬁrm leads to a lower activity at a competing ﬁrm. In such circum-
stances, extrapolating microecometric results to the aggregate level by summing
up the number of posts created would largely overestimate the realistic eﬀects
of the subsidy. A new study by Pierrard [2005] has recently revealed that a
general equilibrium model with job competition, featuring minimum wages and
endogenous job destruction, produces similar quantitative results as predicted
by microeconometric models. In fact, as Laroque and Salanié [2000] and Crépon
and Desplatz [2001] have shown for France, Pierrard establishes for Belgium
the importance of tax cut targeting at minimum wages and, along the lines of
Crépon and Desplatz [2002] and Kramarz and Philippon [2000], he shows that
a reduction in social security contributions aﬀects employment mainly through
its impact on job destruction.
This ﬁnding is line with the prediction of Mortensen and Pissarides [1998]
that, in a time of an economic shock, if ﬁrms have a choice either to destroy a
job or adjust it against a ﬁxed cost, the former will be chosen. Seminal work
on job destruction can be found in Mortensen and Pissarides [1994], where job
destruction is shown to have more volatile dynamics than job creation. Skill
heterogeneities are explicitly treated in Mortensen and Pissarides [1999], where
the matches arise between ﬁrms and workers that are perfectly suited for each
other and turbulence is modeled as shocks to match productivity. Policy issues
are discussed and simulations for a welfare (European) and a laissez-faire (USA)
3Macroeconomic studies predict that with a subsidy of 1% of GDP ex ante, some 30 000
- 100 000 jobs would be created in Belgium at the annual cost ex post in the region of an
annual gross wage paid to a low skilled, roughly 25 000 euro. Microeconometric studies would
predict, on the other hand, some 250 000 - 300 000 additional jobs created at a negative cost
ex post.
7economies reveal clearly a more convex unemployment-skill proﬁle for Europe.
Mortensen and Pissarides do not consider spillover eﬀects due to job com-
petition between diﬀerent skill groups. In fact, as we have seen, there does
not exist a clear empirical concensus with respect to the implications of ladder
eﬀects for the low skilled unemployment rate. However, a theoretical study of
Blazquez and Jansen [2003] clearly points out to ineﬃciencies due to job com-
petition: equilibrium with ex post bargaining is never eﬃcient and under Hosios
condition the skilled are undervalued in equilibrium, thereby ﬁrms create too
few unskilled jobs, which results in suboptimally high unemployment rates for
the low skilled. The unemployment rate of the high skilled is optimal but too
many skilled are employed on low productivity jobs4.
Finally, there is the question of on-the-job search which goes in pair with
job competition. Some general evidence for the existence of on-the-job search
can be found in Pissarides and Wadsworth [1994] or Pissarides [1994]. Focusing
on heterogeneity, Dolado, Jansen and Jimeno [2003], by extending the model
of Albrecht and Vroman [2002], look at the ineﬃciencies induced by on-the-job
search when job competition indeed takes place and ﬁnd that higher quit rate
of mismatched workers exerts further negative externality on the unskilled and
so weakens their labour market position. Kleven and Sorensen [2004] point
out that initial search in multiple markets may also harm employment in the
primary high-tech sector as it discourages the creation of complex jobs, while
on-the-job search in the time of a tax reform towards higher progression might
worsen total employment and welfare.
In this paper we would like to investigate two problems. First, we ask what
really drives the eﬀects of tax cuts in calibrated macroeconomic models: is it
the targeting of a subsidy at minimum wages or accounting for job destruction?
Answering this question seems crucial in the light of this type of models being
widely used for policy evaluation and in order to illuminate the importance of
analysis à la Mortensen and Pissarides. In this context, we attempt to inves-
tigate labour market adjustments, macroeconomic performance of an economy
and welfare implications under the policy of selective reductions in labour tax-
ation. Second, we are particularly interested in quantifying the ineﬃciencies
induced by job competition, ladder eﬀects and on-the-job search, especially as
these seem to be predominantly present at the job destruction margin. Al-
though in reality a relatively small fraction of jobs seems to be occupied by
overqualiﬁed workers, the implications of the presence of such phenomena for
the eﬀectiveness of policies aimed at reducing low skilled unemployment might
be signiﬁcant. It has already been pointed out in literature that, if job competi-
tion indeed takes place, training is an ineﬀective policy against unemployment
4Blazquez and Jansen [2003] build upon literature on ineﬃciencies due to agent hetero-
geneities. Sattinger [1995] shows that heterogeneity gives rise to multiple and ineﬃcient equi-
libria. Shimer and Smith [2001] ﬁnd that decentralised equilibrium is not eﬃcient without
search subsidies since the skilled do not search hard enough and accept too many simple jobs.
In similar spirit, Blazquez and Jansen [2003] propose that the government should levy a lump
sum tax on the low skilled unemployed and implement a lump sum subsidy to the high skilled
unemployed, or alternatively levy a hiring tax on skilled jobs.
8and rather job creation of skilled jobs should be encouraged.
We construct a general equilibrium model with heterogenous labour and dis-
tinguish three, rather than two as it has most commonly been done so far in
literature, skill groups in order to be able to investigate both narrow tax cut
targeting and the importance of ladder eﬀects. We account for labour market
frictions, wage bargaining and rigid minimum wages. Job destruction is kept
exogenous, which will allow us to set our result against the predictions of mod-
els with endogenous job destruction. Two scenarios are considered: with job
competition, on the job search and endogenous search eﬀort, and without. We
calibrate our economy for Belgium which is an example of a European country
particularly plagued by unemployment, especially among the low skilled, but
bear in mind that our analysis could easily be extended to other countries.
The paper is structured as follows. Section two describes the model, calibra-
tion and the nature of simulations. Section three discusses the long run eﬀects
of reductions in employer social security contributions for the economies with
and without job competition. Transitional dynamics are presented in section
four. In section ﬁve we look at the long run eﬀects of diﬀerent subsidy rates in
the context of employment changes, policy cost, policy ﬁnancing methods and
welfare. Section six concludes.
2 The Model
We construct an intertemporal dynamic general equilibrium model. This set-
up allows us to model agents’ savings and consumption that interact with the
evolutions of employment, to evaluate the eﬀects of policy on welfare and, by ac-
counting for the role of expectations, to make a distinction between the short and
long run. The eﬀects of policy might diﬀer in the short and long run as the result
of frictions which exist in the labour market and take form of a matching func-
tion à la Pissarides [2000] for vacancies and job seekers. Our approach is drawn
from literature that reconciles the theory of real business cycles with search in
the labor market (Merz [1995], Andolfatto [1996], Yashiv [2004]). We use and
extend the methodology developed by Pierrard and Sneessens [2004] who incor-
porate a skill dimension à la Albrecht and Vroman [2002] and Dolado [2002],
as well as separate matching functions for heterogenous ﬁrms along the lines of
Gautier [2002], into a dynamic general equilibrium model of Joseph, Pierrard
and Sneessens [2004], with workers that are subject to job competition, search
on the job and choose endogenously their search eﬀort, intermediate ﬁrms and
a ﬁnal representative ﬁrm. Time is discrete. Two separate economies, with and
without job competition, are built.
2.1 Labour market ﬂows
Consider an economy with a constant population. There exist three professional
categories, each corresponding to a distinct qualiﬁcation or skill level, that con-
stitute constant fractions of the population, are indexed by i = h;s;l for the
9high skilled, skilled and low skilled, respectively, and whose members at time
t can be either employed or unemployed. This skill partition is exogenous, de-
termined by the prior investment in human capital. There are three types of
intermediate one-worker ﬁrms indexed by j = t;m;b for top, medium and bot-
tom technologies that deﬁne the complexity of tasks involved on the job. Since
in the presence of job competition the high skilled and skilled can search for
jobs in the sector for which they are one level overqualiﬁed, as shown by dotted
and dashed lines in Figure 5, skill populations have the following composition:
Ui;t + Nij;t + Nik;t = ®i; (1)
with the fractions of agents in each skill group that are unemployed, employed
in their optimal sector j and employed in their alternative sector k.
P
i ®i = 1.
Clearly, there are no overqualiﬁed low skilled.
Although the unemployed devote all their time to job search, they spend
fractions eu
i;t and 1 ¡ eu
i;t of search time exploring, respectively, the optimal
and suboptimal labour markets. Search intensities are increasing functions of





ifed, workers devote a fraction eo
i;t of their spare time to search on the job for
better matches, which translates into a search eﬃciency so
i;t by the means of an
increasing function so
i(eo
i;t). Since the least skilled are restricted to seek jobs
only in the bottom labor market, their only search intensity as unemployed is
normalised to unity.
Let Mj;t be new matches in sector j formed in a given period accord-
ing to a constant returns to scale matching function. The function Mj;t =
mjM(Vj;t;­j;t) represents matching frictions that arise due to co-ordination
problems in the labour market and it is increasing in exogenous matching ef-
ﬁciency mj, vacancies Vj and the pool ­j of eﬃcient job seekers in sector j.
Within ­j the numbers of unemployed or employed job seekers are adjusted
by their respective search eﬃciencies. Deﬁning sectoral market tightness as
µj =
Vj





= mj '(µj;t); (2)





= mj Ã(µj;t); (3)
where Ã is a negative function of tightness. In the presence of job competition,
intermediate ﬁrms face probabilities !j;tqj;t and (1 ¡ !j;t)qj;t of hiring, respec-
tively, a qualiﬁed or an overqualiﬁed worker. !j;t is the qualiﬁed fraction of
eﬃcient job seekers in sector j. In the top segment all applicants are perfectly
qualiﬁed.
The ﬂows in the labour market are determined by the rates of job destruction
and job creation. The duration of an employment spell is the function of all
possible developments that can occur and incite either a ﬁrm or a worker to
10end the contract, which we take into account by assuming that a fraction Áj
of existing jobs is destroyed each period. Total employment in a given sector
remains constant if the number of jobs destroyed equals the number of jobs
created in that sector (stationary equilibrium).
Labour market ﬂows for individual worker types can be deﬁned as follows.
The number of the members of category i that are employed by and perfectly
qualiﬁed for sector j evolves over time according to:
Nij;t+1 = (1 ¡ Áj) Nij;t + !j qj;tVj;t; (4)
and the number of the members of category i that are employed by and overqual-
iﬁed for an alternative sector k is:
Nik;t+1 = (1 ¡ Ák) Nik;t + (1 ¡ !k) qk;tVk;t: (5)
Total employment in each sector is Nj;t = §iNij;t.
With perfectly segmented labour markets, each worker type can be employed
exclusively by a ﬁrm corresponding to her skill level. The unemployed devote
all their time to job search in their skill-speciﬁc labour market and we nor-
malise their search eﬃciencies to unity. There is no on-the-job search. All ﬁrms
face perfectly qualiﬁed applicants and in all cases the fraction !j of qualiﬁed
applicants is unitary.
2.2 Intermediate ﬁrms
Each intermediate ﬁrm is a one-worker entity that produces an intermediate
good yj and maximises the present value of expected proﬁts. The market for
intermediate goods is perfectly competitive. In the presence of job competition
ﬁrms, with the exception of the top segment where only (6) applies, may ﬁll
a vacancy with more than one type of workers. The present value of expected
proﬁts from a match of some ﬁrm k with some employee l who is perfectly
qualiﬁed for it is:
WF









where ½k;t is the market price of the intermediate good, ¿ is the rate of employer
social security contribution, wlk;t is the bargained gross wage and rt is the
rate of interest. The present value of expected proﬁts from a match with an














where wik;t stands for the gross wage bargained with an overqualiﬁed worker.
The wages bargained with qualiﬁed and overqualiﬁed workers may diﬀer since
the ﬁrm takes into account the probability that an overqualiﬁed worker might
11quit, which depends on her on-the-job search eﬃciency and the probability to
contract a match in sector j which is optimal for her. Finally, the present value















with ak being a per-period recruitment cost. Firms post vacancies until no-entry
condition holds, that is until the present value of a vacancy reaches zero. A job
is created when the ﬁrm ﬁnds a job seeking worker with a satisfying qualiﬁcation
level.
With no job competition, (7) clearly does not apply and (8) simpliﬁes thanks
to unitary !k.
2.3 Representative ﬁnal good ﬁrm
The majority of economic models aimed at analysing the mismatch between
the supply of and the demand for skills assume that all ﬁrms produce the same
good regardless of the technology and the type of labour employed (Albrecht
and Vroman [2002] and Dolado et al. [2002]). Hence the total production of the
economy becomes the sum of productions of individual ﬁrms. Such a setting
means that the workers of diﬀerent skills are perfect substitutes. Empirical
evidence suggests otherwise (Manacorda and Petrongolo [1999]).
Since we have distinguish between three intermediate goods, we allow now
the representative ﬁnal good to be produced using these intermediate inputs
and capital. Because intermediate inputs are associated with three diﬀerent
technologies and skill levels required in their production, this speciﬁcation in-
troduces an interdependence between the three types of intermediate ﬁrms and,
consequently, the three labour markets, and leads to ﬁnite elasticities of substi-
tution between skills
Moreover, by augmenting their marginal productivity, a rise in demand for
one intermediate input stimulates the demand for the others and subsequently
for the workers of the remaining skills. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁnal ﬁrm chooses the
optimal levels of capital Kt and intermediate inputs Qj;t to maximises its proﬁts:
Wt = F(Kt;Qt) ¡
X
j




where F > 0 is a production function satisfying standard assumptions F0 > 0
and F00 < 0. Qt = (Qt;t;Qm;t;Qb;t), Qj;t = yj Nj;t and ± is the depreciation
rate of capital. The ﬁrst order conditions follow:
FKt = rt + ±; (10)
FQj;t = ½j;t 8j: (11)
122.4 Households
We distinguish three categories of households, one for each skill group. We as-
sume that the least skilled in each period consume their disposable income from
wages and unemployment beneﬁts5. The skilled and high skilled households,
on the other hand, are the owners of intermediate ﬁrms, have access to capital
markets and choose investment Ii;t and search times eu
i;t and eo
i;t to maximise
their current and expected future welfare:
WH
i;t = U(Ci;t) ¡ D(Nij;t) ¡ Do(Nik;t) + ¯Et[WH
i;t+1] (12)




Ii;t = Ki;t+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)Ki;t: (14)
U, D and Do represent respectively the utility of consumption and the disutility
of qualiﬁed and overqualiﬁed employment. Unemployment beneﬁt is given by
bi;t, ¯ is a subjective discount factor, ¿j and ¿k are the rates of personal taxation
depending on the wages received, Ti;t stands for lump sum transfers and the
household has a share ¼i in intermediate ﬁrm proﬁts, so that ¼i;t = ¼i
P
j ¼j;t
The resulting ﬁrst order conditions are standard:












i;t = 0; (17)
and marginal welfare values evolve according to:
WH






Nik;t = UCi;t[(1 ¡ ¿k)wik;t ¡ bi;t] ¡ Do
Nik;t + ¯ pi;t(so
i;t ¡ si;t)Et[WH
Nij;t+1]
+¯ (1 ¡ Ák ¡ so
i;t pj;t ¡ s0
i;t pk;t)Et[WH
Nik;t+1]: (19)
Accumulated savings constitute the stock of capital lent to the representative
ﬁnal ﬁrm. The market for capital rental is perfectly competitive. Equilibrium
between the supply of and demand for capital is ensured by the instantaneous
adjustment of the interest rate. The aggregate capital stock is given by Kt = P
i Ki;t.
5In the light of this category of workers being paid a minimum wage and living from
hand to mouth, this hypothesis seems reasonable. The welfare function of the low skilled is
nevertheless represented in the parallel way to other skill groups.
13When labour markets are segmented, there is no overqualiﬁed employment,
the resulting wages or disutility. (12) and (13) simplify accordingly and only
the ﬁrst order condition (14) holds. Marginal welfare reduces to:
WH
Ni;t = UCi;t[(1 ¡ ¿j) wj;t ¡ bi;t] ¡ DNi;t + ¯ (1 ¡ Áj ¡ pj;t)EtWH
Ni;t+1: (20)
The traditional assumption of a representative household ensures that the
workers of each skill insure mutually against the risk of unemployment. This
approach allows us to easily model savings and investment. The assumption of
such a perfect insurance is rather strong but indispensable if we wish to avoid
modeling diﬃculties associated with the heterogeneity of income due to the
risk of unemployment in the absence of perfect insurance. The assumption is
not damaging since the two categories of workers that save face relatively low
probabilities of unemployment.
2.5 Wage formation
The presence of informational problems and matching frictions in the labour
market is synonymous with imperfect competition. Moreover, we assume that
salaries are no longer determined in the equilibrium of the supply of and demand
demand for labour, but are negotiated between ﬁrms and workers. The most
common representation of wage bargaining is based on the sharing between a
ﬁrm and a worker of an economic surplus that arises from a successful match.
The ﬁrm makes a positive proﬁt (the wage paid is lower than the worker’s
marginal productivity), while the worker is remunerated above his reservation
wage. The key to the partition of the surplus lies in the respective bargaining
powers of the ﬁrm and the worker. The surplus itself can vary over time in
response to variables such as productivity or interest rates. Wages are renego-
tiated each period. This set-up allows for the modeling of a relatively ﬂexible
but realistic wage process, and the better assessment of the eﬀects of tax policy.
Formally, the result of wage negotiations is represented for perfect matches








The ﬁrst and the second term of the two above stand for the valuation of
the match surplus by the worker and the ﬁrm respectively. Parameter ´ is the
bargaining power of the worker. We use this representation of wage bargaining
to determine gross salaries in the two upper labour market segments6.
In the recent decades, the ratio of the lowest to the highest wages has re-
mained stable in Europe (OCDE [1996]). We therefore assume that minimum
6In the presence of job competition bargaining results in two wages wsm;t and whm;t paid
in the middle sector, and one wage wht;t in the top sector, that can be written as wt;t for
simplicity. Without job competition, bargained wages are simply wm;t and wt;t.
14wages paid in the bottom intermediate sector are indexed on the wage in the
top sector and evolve with time inertia:
wb;t = ind(®0wt;t + ®1wt;t¡1 + ®2wt;t¡2 + ®3wt;t¡3 + ®4wt;t¡4): (22)
2.6 Government
For simplicity, we assume that government balances its budget each period and
account purely for the elements of the budget associated directly with the labour
market7. In each period, government spending on government consumption and















where Gt stands for public consumption. Unemployment beneﬁts bi;t are de-
termined for each skill type i by replacement ratios %i with respect to average
gross salaries paid to that skill type.












The model is calibrated on quarterly data for Belgian economy in the mid-
nineties. The calibrated parameters fall into three categories: (i) standard values
found in all models of this type; (ii) parameters speciﬁc to this particular model
for which we have empirical information; (iii) parameters speciﬁc to this model
for which we do not have direct information; their values are ﬁxed so that the
model reproduces the state of the economy similar to that of the mid-nineties
with respect to a number of endogenous variables such as unemployment rate,
probability to ﬁnd a job, probability to ﬁll a vacancy, wage ratios and alike.
As in RBC models, we set the quarterly depreciation rate of capital at 2.5%
and the psychological discount factor at 0.99 implying the quarterly rate of
interest of 1%. The ﬁnal good production function is a constant-returns-to-scale
Cobb-Douglas form, as shown appropriate by Manacorda and Petrongolo [1999]:
F(Kt;Qt) = "(Kt)#(Qh;t)¹(Qm;t)º(Qb;t)1¡#¡¹¡º:
The elasticity of ﬁnal output with respect to capital is 0.33 commonly seen in
literature. The coeﬃcients associated with other intermediate inputs are based
on the estimation of Sneessens and Shadman [2000] in such a way that realistic
7The introduction of public debt would not change our results since the assumption of
perfect capital markets imply the Ricardian equivalence: taxation today or tomorrow does
not change the consumption or capital accumulation proﬁle.
15factor shares are obtained. In particular, we adopt their value of 0.51 for the
elasticity of output with respect to the most complex input. The elasticity of
output with respect to the least complex input of 0.05 implies the absolute
value of 1.05 of the wage elasticity of demand for the least qualiﬁed labour,
which seems very reasonable.
The composition of the active labour force (deﬁned broadly to include the
workers of pre-retirement age and the aged unemployed) plays a crucial role.
Our objective is to evaluate the impact of very narrow targeting of reductions
in employer social contributions, more narrow than that considered so far in
literature8. Most commonly, previous studies of general equilibrium with het-
erogenous agents distinguish only two qualiﬁcation levels, the low and the high
skilled. We specify three groups by dividing the low skilled into two subgroups:
one with low (primary education diploma) and the other with medium (lower
secondary education diploma) qualiﬁcation attainment. These two groups rep-
resent respectively 15% and 21% of the active work force (INS [1997]). Ac-
counting for the unemployed, this partition corresponds well to the percentage
of employees paid (sectoral) minimum wages in Belgium, approximately 10%
of the salaried population (Pierrard [2005]). The high skilled (with at least an
upper secondary degree) constitute 64% of the work force. Their average share
in the economy’s savings and ﬁrm ownership is set at 77% (INS [1996-97]).
Empirical evidence (Petrongolo and Pissarides [2001]) suggests a constant-
returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas matching functions:
Mj;t = mj(Vj;t;­j;t) = mj(Vj;t)¸
j
(­j;t)1¡¸j:
Empirical studies ﬁnd the values for the elasticity of matches with respect to
vacancies between 0.4 and 0.6. Van der Linden and Dor [2001] estimate it at 0.4
for Belgium, which we adopt here for all intermediate sectors. Little information
existing on the values of matching eﬃciencies mj, we ﬁx them at 0.45, 0.33 and
0.24 for j = ft;m;bg, respectively, to reproduce the job ﬁnding probabilities
pj from mid-nineties, estimated by Cockx-Dejemeppe [2002] to be accordingly
0.40, 0.25 and 0.15.
The salaries of the skilled and high skilled are bargained. The bargaining
powers for those workers are ﬁxed to be 0.6, a value commonly used in the
models of this type. The least skilled are paid a minimum wage which repre-
sents approximately 50% (ind = 0.5) of the high skilled wage (INS [1995-97],
OECD [1996]) and evolves proportionally to it. This adjustment is subject to
time inertia, with ®0 = 0, ®1 = 0:1, ®0 = 0:1, ®0 = 0:3 and ®0 = 0:5 as in Pier-
rard [2005]. Gross replacement ratios between an average unemployment beneﬁt
and gross wages have been calculated based on the wage data from INS [1995-
99], the beneﬁts data from ONEM [1997] and the information on the taxation
of beneﬁts from OECD [1997]. We ﬁx them at 0.28, 0.36 and 0.57 for the high
skilled, skilled and low skilled respectively. We take the rate of employer social
contributions equal 34% for all intermediate ﬁrms, the value drawn from the
8Speciﬁcally for Belgium, see papers by Sneessens and Shadman [2000], Pierrard and
Sneessens [2003, 2004] and Pierrard [2005].
16model HERMES [2000]. The sum of the rates of employee social contributions
(13.07%) and personal income taxation, taken from Bulletin Social [1997], gives
on average personal tax rates of 38%, 33% and 24% for the high skilled, skilled
and low skilled.
Job destruction rates have been chosen to respect the lower bound estimated
by Van der Linden and Dor [2001] at 3.9% per quarter and to reproduce the
unemployment rates in the mid-nineties of 7.9%, 17% et 28% respectively for
the high skilled, skilled and low skilled (INS [1997]). In this way, we obtain
job destruction rates of 3.45%, 5.15% and 5.8% for top, medium and bottom
sectors, respectively. Output per workers yj, regardless of skill level, in the
three intermediate sectors is set at 1, 0.8 and 0.6 to ensure realistic asset val-
ues of ﬁrms. In fact, Gautier et al. [2002] show that skilled workers are no
more productive on simple jobs than the low skilled. According to Delmotte et
al. [2001], 52% of vacancies were ﬁlled in the course of a quarter in 2000. Their
study does not show any systematic diﬀerences in these probabilities subject
to job complexity. We therefore calibrate the cost of opening a vacancy in the
way to obtain a 50% probability of ﬁlling a vacancy for all types of jobs. This
recruitment cost represents approximately 10% of the total wage cost per pe-
riod (Abowd-Kramarz [2003]) and is such that it is more costly to recruit more
qualiﬁed workers: at = 0:11, am = 0:09 and ab = 0:055.
For simplicity, we assumed a standard logarithmic utility of consumpiton
and a linear disutility of employment and overqualiﬁed employment:
U(Ci;t) = lnCi;t D(Nij;t) = diNij;t Do(Nik;t) = do
iNik;t:
To close the model and ensure the non-negativity of marginal welfare values in
the wage bargaining equations, parameter do
i = 0:1 is uniform for all skills, while
the values of di are ﬁxed at 0.27, 0.57 and 0.75 for i = fh;s;lg, respectively, in
the job competition case and at 0.29, 0.90 and 1.20 in segmented markets. The
diﬀerence in parameters in the two cases results from the diﬀerences in marginal
welfare equations which in the two scenarios must be made compatible with the
baseline steady state. This is to be expected, given the result of Blazquez and
Jansen [2003] on the properties of equilibrium with and without job competition.
Finally, we must specify the relationship between search time and search
eﬃciency. The existing information on the subject is rather modest. To limit
the number of additional parameters, we represent search intensity as a concave
function (implying a decreasing marginal productivity of search time) for all
workers and markets:
















The parameters for each of these functions are chosen to reproduce the per-
centage of overqualiﬁed workers close to that suggested by empirical studies
(Hartog [2000]), in the region of 10%, the realistic fractions of time spent on
search (around 80% for the search in the optimal and the remaining 20% in the
suboptimal market, and around 10% of spare time devoted to the on-the-job
search), as well as the realistic values for the sensitivity of search eﬀort to labour
17market tensions so that ﬁrst order conditions are satisﬁed and the slope param-
eters are as large as possible. As the result, we set for i = h;s;l respectively:
si;0 = f0:75;0:6;1g; si;1 = f0:175;0:3;0g; s0
i;0 = f0g; s0
i;1 = f0:45;0:5;0g; so
i;0 =
f0:15;0:1;0g and so
i;1 = f0:2;0:1;0g. When markets are perfectly segmented, all
search intensities si;t are normalised to one and hence for i = fh;s;lg, respec-
tively, we obtain si;0 = f1g and si;1 = f0g.
Changes in the parameters of disutility or search intensity functions are of
no major importance for quantitative results. As expected, some quantitative
but not qualitative diﬀerences do arise if central parameters of the model are
altered, for example the bargaining power of workers or the degree of inertia
in minimum wages. This particular parametrisation is consistent with that of
earlier studies for France and Belgium and allows us to compare our results
with previous literature. Finally, calibrations of our economy with and without
job competition being on the same baseline steady state, our exercise meets the
interest of our particular agenda to assess reliably the eﬀects induced by job
competition and ladder eﬀects.
2.8 Simulations
The values of endogenous variables obtained in the model, calibrated in the
manner outlined above for the two economies, will serve as a reference point in
the calculation of the eﬀects of diﬀerent economic policies. The ﬁrst scenario
involves a reduction in employer social security contributions targeted at the
lowest wages. The reduction xb in employer taxation rate ¿ is ﬁnanced by a
lump sum tax Th;t on the high skilled in such a manner that the government
budget remains balanced. Moreover, xb is such that the ex ante cost of the
subsidy represents 1% of GDP9. Alternative policies are deﬁned in a parallel
way, but are targeted at diﬀerent sectors: xm, xt and xb+m. In all the cases,
the ex ante cost of the reduction remains 1% of GDP.
Alternative methods of policy ﬁnancing will be considered. Next to lump
sum taxation, ﬁnancing of the policy by proportional taxation on high-tech ﬁrms
or proportional income taxation on the high skilled will be examined.
3 Long run eﬀects of reductions in employer so-
cial security contributions
Table 1 summarises long run simulation results for an economy with perfectly
segmented labour markets. The number of jobs created lies in the region of
90 000 when tax cuts are targeted at minimum wages. The rise in employment
and the level of economic activity is suﬃciently strong to render the measure
self-ﬁnancing via a reduction in the outlay on unemployment beneﬁts and a rise
in the revenues from labour taxation.
9That is to facilitate quantitative comparison with previous studies.
18Table 1: Eﬀects of a reduction in payroll taxation valued at 1% GDP, ﬁnanced
by lump sum taxation. No job competition.
Targeted sector
(a) (b) (c) (d)
B B+M M T
Tax cut (%) 26.7 8.5 12.5 2.7
Ex ante wage cost* (% change) B -20.0 -6.0
M -6.0 -9.0
T -2.0
Ex post wage cost (% change) B -18.8 -5.8 0.2 1.8
M 1.3 -0.3 -1.2 0.0
T 1.3 0.6 1.2 -0.2
Additional employment** B 89 229 28 171 30 -7 984
M 348 6 061 8 845 84
T 895 345 144 2 708
TOTAL 90 472 34 577 9 019 -5 193
Cost per job created
(’000 euro per year) -1.86 14.9 112 -
Production (% change) 1.36 0.58 0.17 -0.06
Productivity (% change) -1.03 -0.33 -0.06 0.08
Welfare (% change) l 0.77 0.29 0.05 0.52
s 0.70 0.46 0.30 -0.11
h 1.37 0.63 0.08 -0.23
*Total as faced by employers, including payroll taxation.
**Active labour force (of which unemployed) is as follows:
low skilled 642 394 (173 978), skilled 935 343 (157 162),
high skilled 2 813 722 (221 097). Source: INS [1997].
19Table 2: Eﬀects of a reduction in payroll taxation valued at 1% GDP, ﬁnanced
by lump sum taxation. Job competition and on-the-job search.
Targeted sector
(a) (b) (c) (d)
B B+M M T
Tax cut (%) 26.7 8.5 12.5 2.7
Ex ante wage cost (% change) B -20.0 -6.0
M -6.0 -9.0
T -2.0
Ex post wage cost (% change) B l -19.0 -5.3 1.1 1.6
s -19.0 -5.4 1.1 1.6
M s 2.8 -3.2 -4 1.2
h 2.6 -3.5 -6.2 -1.5
T h 1.2 1.1 1.1 -0.4
Additional employment B l 69 855 35 810 20 392 -2 018
s 36 594 -9 054 -26 328 -4 725
M s -22 629 13 276 27 419 5 859
h 8 296 16 592 22 436 -13 920
T h -4 525 -11 715 -16 699 15 382
TOTAL 87 590 44 908 27 219 578
Cost per job created
(’000 euro per year) 2.0 9.3 25.1 1 377.6
Overqualiﬁed workers (% change) B 4.0 -2.1 -4.9 -0.8
M 1.3 1.7 2.1 -1.7
B+M 2.5 0.2 -0.6 -1.3
Production (% change) 0.99 0.64 0.4 0.21
Productivity (% change) -1.31 -0.74 -0.32 0.19
Welfare (% change) l 0.84 0.59 -0.47 -0.45
s -0.72 -0.71 -0.93 -0.94
h -1.65 -1.63 -2.02 -2.17
20The eﬀect on employment is more than halved when targeting is broader on
sectors B and M jointly, as adopted in earlier simulations for Belgium10. Those
studies obtain some 50 000 additional jobs, as opposed to our 35 000, with an
identical policy. The diﬀerence between the two estimations arises essentially as
the result of a diﬀerent eﬀect on wages wm in the middle sector, which rise in
our scenario. By distinguishing only two categories of workers, previous studies
assume that the salaries of both the low skilled and skilled are indexed on the
highest wages, while we assume more correctly that wm is negotiated. Contrary
to our result, they ﬁnd a positive and non-trivial cost per job created.
We observe that policy targeting at relatively high wages (sectors M or T
individually) has an employment eﬀect only weakly positive (column (c)), or
even negative (column (d)). This is the case because the negotiated gross wages
rise, absorbing the majority of the tax cut. The minimum wage, being indexed
on high wages, rises as well and leads to a rather signiﬁcant reduction in the
number of simple jobs. Scenario (d) is especially intuitive: the reduction of
social security contributions targeted at the most complex jobs turns out coun-
terproductive since it leads to higher expenses associated with the recruitment
activity in the sector where such expenses, in the light of labour market tightness
in that sector, are not proﬁtable at the margin.
It is worth noticing that scenario (a) obtains an increase in the welfare
of all workers, at least in the long run. A rise in the high skilled welfare is
even larger than that observed in scenario (d). As pointed out by literature
on tax progression, although employment and ﬁnal production increase, the
productivity of the economy declines.
We therefore ﬁnd, mutatis mutandis, the same result as in a general equi-
librium model with endogenous job destruction and minimum wages11: policy
targeting at the 10% of workers paid the lowest wages stimulates employment to
the extent that the policy measure is self-ﬁnancing. The eﬀect on employment
is, nevertheless, still three times weaker. Because we specify job destruction pro-
cess as exogenous and not depending on the wage cost borne by the bottom-end
ﬁrms, we can infer that the two channels of both job creation and job destruc-
tion, through which are passed the eﬀects of a tax cut are rather important:
the former is suﬃcient to guarantee self-ﬁnancing, however the latter seems to
be the more powerful one, in line with Mortensen and Pissarides [1994, 1998,
1999].
Simulation details for a scenario with job competition and on-the-job search are
displayed in Table 2. As previously, the targeting of social security reductions
at the lowest wages leads to the creation of jobs in the region of 90 000. This
similarity in terms of numbers is however misleading: search behaviour and lad-
der eﬀects result in a non-negligible fraction of newly created simple jobs being
occupied by overqualiﬁed workers. Employment changes in column (a) show
clearly the importance of ladder eﬀects. The reduction of social security con-
10For example Pierrard and Sneessens [2003].
11Pierrard [2005] for Belgium.
21tributions targeted at the lowest wages is, therefore, less eﬀective in alleviating
low skilled unemployment than when labour market are perfectly segmented.
Moreover, with job competition present, the measure is no longer self-ﬁnancing.
Cost per job created remains however rather low, around 2 000 euro per year.
On the other hand, the measure does not beneﬁt all workers: the welfare of the
low skilled rises but that of the other two groups, who constitute 85% of the
population, falls, which is not without importance in terms of political decision
making.
As earlier, a broader targeting (B+M) stimulates employment of both the
low skilled and the skilled but the number of jobs created is again much lower.
Cost per job created remains reasonable. A reduction targeted at the high skilled
(column (d)) reduces job competition and the ladder eﬀects recede, resulting in
a better employment result than in the scenario with segmented labour markets.
The number of jobs created is positive but the cost per new job is exorbitant.
In spite of a rise in average productivity, employment and aggregate pro-
duction, skilled and high skilled enjoy lower welfare! That is due to some of
them now being paid lower wages on jobs for which they are overqualiﬁed, and
having disutility of on-the-job search. It must be remembered that, in a more
realistic setting, a reduction of social security contributions would also have a
positive eﬀect on employment through lower job destruction, which has not been
taken into account here. It might then as well be that the measure is indeed
self-ﬁnancing. While this channel of transmission has been neglected, the cost
of the police is very low in the long run: less than 0.2% of GDP leading to a
reduction in the unemployment rate of the least skilled by some 10%.
4 Transitional dynamics
Graphs in Figure 6 show for the perfectly segmented labour markets the evolu-
tion over time (measured in quarters) of the most signiﬁcant variables (unem-
ployment rates, wages, policy cost and consumption) in response to a reduction
in employer social security contributions targeted at minimum wages and ﬁ-
nanced by lump sum taxation. The rate of unemployment of the low skilled
falls gradually. Consequently, the cost of the measure remains positive for a few
quarters. The workers who bear this cost in the meantime are, however, ra-
tional agents. Since they have access to capital markets, they can immediately
increase their level of consumption and welfare12. Therefore we do not observe
a fall in the quality of life, neither in the long run or during the transition.
These transition dynamics are very fast, too fast to be credible. The only
elements that prevent instantaneous adjustment of variables are the accumula-
tion of capital, labour market frictions and the evolution of the minimum wage
with a ﬁve-period inertia. Otherwise, nominal rigidities of wages and prices
are absent and our analysis is in real terms only. A decrease in payroll taxes
targeted at minimum wages lowers the cost of labour in a sector where labour is
12The latter is not shown in the graphs just yet but the evolution of welfare follows closely
that of consumption.
22abundant. This policy assures the proﬁtability of labour intensive ﬁrms and in-
creases the supply of goods which they produce, thereby improving the marginal
productivity and the supply of other intermediate inputs. Ignoring further wage
and price rigidities is equivalent to assuming that this supply is instantly met by
demand as the result of an immediate adjustment of relative prices and wages.
It is generally believed, however, that the presence of nominal rigidities tends to
slow down adjustment to full employment. Recent developments in macro- and
monetary economics are based on an intertemporal general equilibrium but they
emphasise the importance of nominal rigidities in short- and medium-term. In
order to possibly see anything close to realistic transition dynamics, our setting
would need to include both structural and broader nominal rigidities. Never-
theless, although rather fast the transition, long run analysis is not aﬀected.
Figure 7 shows, for the case of job competition and on-the-job search, the
dynamics of the most crucial variables, including the size of the ladder eﬀect,
following a tax cut targeted as before at minimum wages and ﬁnanced by lump
sum taxation on the high skilled. In comparison with Figure 7, two points
should be emphasised. First, we observe a gradual rise in the proportion of
overqualiﬁed workers, which increases from 10 to 12% and 14% on tech and
low-tech jobs, respectively. Intuitively, it seems realistic, given that little precise
information exists on the actual size of his phenomenon. Second, consumption
of the high skilled and skilled falls by some 2.5% and even slightly more than
that in the short run. This occurs not only because the policy cost is positive,
but also because a fraction of the high skilled and skilled are now employed on
less complex jobs which pay lower wages.
5 Long run eﬀects of diﬀerent subsidy rates at
minimum wages
5.1 Employment
Focusing on social security reductions targeted at minimum wages, Figure 8
allows for the comparison of employment responses to the policy with and with-
out the presence of job competition and on-the-job search. It looks as if job
competition played insigniﬁcant role: the number of additional jobs created is
almost identical. However, we have seen in Tables 1 and 2 that this similarity
of gross numbers disguises the true skill composition of the newly employed.
Moreover, a larger number of simple jobs are created when job competition is
present (106 449 as opposed to 89 229). Since with job competition the pool
of potential job applicants is larger, the cost of having a vacancy open falls,
which in addition to the subsidy encourages job creation. On the other hand,
improvement in labour demand in the low-tech sector increases the probability
of contracting a simple job and attracts skilled workers who are ready to ac-
cept lower wages while they continue searching for more suited positions in the
meantime. Although optimal from an individual point of view, this is not so
collectively. By causing a transfer of labour towards low-tech sectors, the policy
23leads to the destruction of proﬁtable complex posts.
5.2 Policy cost
Figures 9 and 10 show the evolution of the cost ex post of a policy aimed at
stimulating the demand for the low skilled. The maximum tax reduction is 34%,
which amounts to the total suppression of social security charges at minimum
wages. The cost ex post is measured in terms of the total cost in % of GDP and
the annual average cost per post created in thousands of euro.
With segmented labour markets, the annual average cost per job created is
ﬁrst negative and decreasing, then negative and increasing and ﬁnally becomes
positive when the subsidy reaches the region of 33 percentage points. A reduc-
tion of 26.7%, as in our scenario (a) in Table 1, implies a signiﬁcant reduction of
the low skilled unemployment (from 28 to 14%) at a negative cost to the budget.
Higher demand for low skilled labour is progressively hindered by the tensions
in the labour market (there are less unemployed people available for jobs) and
the growing cost of keeping a vacancy open. The marginal eﬀect (in terms of
jobs created, as well as tax revenues and saving on unemployment beneﬁts that
arise in higher employment) diminishes and, when the average cost reaches zero,
it is no longer possible to further increase employment without increasing the
ﬁnancing tax levied on the high skilled.
The eﬀect of job competition on the skill composition of employment matters
also with respect the policy cost ex post. For reductions beyond 12% the measure
is no longer self-ﬁnancing. The transfer of labour towards low-tech and low paid
jobs reduces the renveues from labour taxation. This cost remains, nevertheless,
moderate (at most 0.2% of GDP or 3 000 euro per year per job created).
In either case, our analysis conﬁrms the prediction of theoretical literature
that there might indeed exist an optimal degree of tax progression that balances
gains against the losses from tax rescheduling.
5.3 Diﬀerent methods of policy ﬁnancing
Until now we have assumed that the reductions of social security contributions
have been ﬁnanced by a lump sum tax (possibly a negative one when the re-
duction generates more resources than it costs) imposed on the high skilled
household whose members earn the highest wages. We will now compare the
eﬀect of various ﬁnancing methods: a lump sum tax, an additional proportional
income tax on the high skilled or an increase in employer social contributions
paid by the most complex ﬁrms (sector T). Regardless of the ﬁnancing method,
we observe grosso modo the same employment proﬁle, as in Figure 11. The
number of jobs created evolves approximately linearly. The result is very sim-
ilar for the cases with and without job competition, hence only the latter is
presented.
Table 3 looks into the eﬀects of social security reductions valued ex ante at
1% of GDP and targeted at the lowest wages in the case without job competition:
because the measure is self-ﬁnancing, the required rate of ﬁnancing tax is very
24low (and negative), which renders the three modes of policy ﬁnancing almost
equivalent, in segmented markets as well as job competition scenario. We may
nevertheless stress two points. First, the redistribution of surplus via a decrease
of personal income tax on the high skilled or employer social security in the
high-tech sector (columns (b) and (c) respectively) stimulates employment in the
high-tech sector by more than a simple lump sum redistribution to households.
This arises because the reduction aﬀects the highest wages at a margin. Second,
the eﬀects of cuts in columns (b) and (c) diﬀer. In (b) a lower income taxation
leads to a moderation of the bargained wages. On the other hand, a cut in
employer social security induces a rise in the bargained wages. Hence, ﬁscal
revenues from labour taxation are higher when ﬁrms are subsidised, which allows
for a larger tax cut (-0.43% rather than -0.25%).
5.4 Welfare
For the case of segmented labour markets, Figure 12 depicts, for each category of
workers, the long run evolution of welfare (essentially the function of the level
of consumption and leisure, and hence the wage income and the probability
of being unemployed) depending on the size of a cut in employer social secu-
rity contributions targeted at minimum wages. Since the measures are largely
self-ﬁnancing, the ﬁgures with diﬀerent methods of policy ﬁnancing are not sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent and, hence, not reported here. Worth noticing is that the
welfare of all worker groups increases with respect to the initial steady state,
even when the measure is no longer self-ﬁnancing, i.e. for very large tax cuts. It
is the high skilled who enjoy the largest welfare gain although the redistributed
budget surplus is close to zero. That arises precisely due to the fact that em-
ployment improvement due to a policy targeted at one sector spills over to other
labour market segments because of certain degree of complementarity between
skills, embodied in the ﬁnal good production function.
The welfare for the three categories of workers when ladder eﬀects are present
is depicted in Figure 13. Again, similar proﬁles are obtained for all methods
of policy ﬁnancing. The diﬀerence with respect to the no-job-competition case
is striking. Only the welfare of the low skilled improves. The welfare of the
skilled falls, although employment has increased, since these workers proceed
towards jobs on which they are both overqualiﬁed and underpaid. The high
skilled experience similar situation when tax cuts exceed some 7% as the budget
surplus is too small to compensate them for the loss of revenue and the disutility
of on-the-job search due to de-qualiﬁcation. We hence observe that, when ladder
eﬀects are introduced, it is no longer true that structural reductions in social
security targeted at minimum wages beneﬁt all worker groups. The introduction
of such a policy causes a signiﬁcant redistribution of revenues and requires that
the interests of diﬀerent skill groups are taken into account. This diﬀerence
should not, however, be overestimated. The policy cost per job created is rather
low comparing to previous literature and it is most likely to be underestimated
in our scenario where job destruction has not been endogenised.
25Table 3: Eﬀects of a reduction in payroll taxes, valued at 1% GDP, targeted at
minimum wages. Diﬀerent ﬁnancing methods. No job competition.
Financing tax
(a) (b) (c)
Lump sum Proportional Proportional
High skilled High-tech ﬁrms
Ex post ﬁnancing tax (%) -0.25 -0.43
Ex ante wage cost (% change) B -20.0 -20.0 -20.0
M
T
Ex post wage cost (% change) B -18.82 -18.83 -18.57
M 1.32 1.35 1.32
T 1.33 1.32 1.63
Additional employment B 89 229 89 379 88 267
M 348 357 339
T 895 1 878 1 332
TOTAL 90 472 91 614 89 938
Cost per job created
(’000 euro per year) -1.86 -2.11 -3.62
Production (% change) 1.36 1.39 1.36
Productivity (% change) -1.03 -1.03 -1.01
Welfare (% change) l 0.77 0.77 0.85
s 0.70 0.72 0.70
h 1.37 1.43 1.35
266 Conclusions
In order to simulate and compare the eﬀects of structural reductions in employer
social security contributions, we have employed a stylised model, in no way
being capable of perfectly reproducing reality, based however on a representative
behaviour of rational agents and accounting for interactions between diﬀerent
markets.
We ﬁnd that narrow targeting of social security reductions at minimum
wages is crucial to the success of the policy of tax cuts. There exists an optimal
rate of subsidy from the viewpoint of government budget.
Particularly, in the case of no job competition, job creation is signiﬁcant
because, in the concerned labour market segment, gross wages are not sensitive
to tax cuts, labour is abundant and recruitment costs are low. Moreover, the
policy measure is largely self-ﬁnancing and beneﬁts all categories of workers.
Based on a comparison with earlier theoretical and empirical literature, and in
line with the reasoning of Mortensen and Pissarides [1994, 1998, 1999], the policy
eﬀects are likely to be reinforced if endogenous job destruction were introduced.
The presence of job competition and on-the-job search introduces some in-
eﬃciencies. The policy is now less eﬀective in reducing the low skilled unem-
ployment due to the overqualiﬁed evicting the unskilled from low-tech jobs.
Moreover, a shift towards less productive and low paid employment reduces
the productivity of the economy, as predicted in theoretical literature, and in-
creases the policy cost, hence rendering the policy no longer unconditionally
self-ﬁnancing. As a result, the welfare of the more skilled groups is likely to fall.
Nevertheless, the policy cost is low comparing to previous empirical studies and
the positive result would most likely be re-established with the introduction of
endogenous job destruction.
Hence, apart from establishing the importance of policy targeting, the ex-
istence of an optimal tax progression and the eﬃciency losses induced by job
competition and on-the-job search, our exercise allows us to better understand
why macro- and microeconometric policy evaluations might be so diﬀerent, and
to shed light on the relative importance of the two transmission channels — job
creation and job destruction, as well as the importance of the evaluation criteria
of policy merits — employment and production versus welfare.
A number of dimensions have of course remained absent from our analysis. Our
division into skill groups in exogenous. It has been suggested that skill up-
grading could alter predictions of the model. It could be also useful to enlarge
the analysis to account for both skill and age groups. A large number of the
least qualiﬁed workers are the old and this aﬀects their search behaviour and
wage bargaining. Moreover, a shift in demand for the low skilled, resulting
from a reduction in wage costs, is larger the more growth dynamics it causes.
Hence a rise in the low skilled employment stimulates and is itself stimulated
by a subsequent rise in the high skilled employment and investment. Since the
low skilled unemployed tend to be clustered in declining regions, with relatively
27little skilled labour and capital, these growth dynamics might not be very pow-
erful. Furthermore, we have considered a closed economy. Looking at an open
economy would involve two modiﬁcations: one of secondary and the another
of primary importance. The secondary change concerns capital mobility which
would alter the transitional dynamics, while the crucial modiﬁcation touches
upon the problem of competitiveness, which is frequently presented as an argu-
ment in favour of non-targeted tax cuts. This argument poses a fundamental
question: are reductions in social security contributions the most appropriate
means of lowering wage costs and stimulating competitiveness?
The analysis in a closed economy provides at least an elementary answer: a
targeted measure is not problematic as long as it is beneﬁcial (or it is perceived
as such) for all categories of workers.
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Figure 5: Labour market ﬂows and production. Job competition and on-the-
job search are represented by dotted and dashed lines for the high skilled and
skilled, respectively.
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Figure 6: Transitional dynamics. Lump sum taxation. No job competition.



















































Figure 7: Transitional dynamics. Lump sum taxation. Job competition and
on-the-job search.





































Figure 8: Number of jobs created depending on the size of a payroll tax cut
targeted at minimum wages. Without and with job competition and on-the-job
search.


































Figure 9: Policy cost ex post, in % of GDP, depending on the size of a tax cut
targeted at minimum wages.













































Figure 10: Policy cost ex post, in euro per year, depending on the size of a tax
cut targeted at minimum wages.




































Proportional on high−tech firms
Proportional on the high−skilled
Figure 11: Number of jobs created depending on the size of a tax cut targeted
at minimum wages. Diﬀerent ﬁnancing methods. No job competition.





























Figure 12: Change in welfare for diﬀerent categories of workers, depending on
the size of a tax cut targeted at minimum wages. No job competition.



































Figure 13: Change in welfare for diﬀerent categories of workers, depending on
the size of a tax cut targeted at minimum wages. Job competition and on-the-
job search.
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